The foreign ministers of the Visegrad Four countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – will meet in Budapest on Tuesday to discuss the situation of the West Balkan states.
The Visegrad Four countries are committed advocates of the stabilisation of the West Balkans and their quest to join the European Union.
The foreign ministers of Belgium and Spain have been invited to Budapest to inform participants about the role they wish to assign to the West Balkans during their term of EU presidency. Both countries will fill the post along with Hungary in 2010 and 2011.
The programme will feature an informal working lunch where the foreign ministers of all West Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia will be informed about the conclusions of the ministerial meeting.
This will be very interesting! In 1992, the UN Security Council Resolution 777 adopted the EU-erected Badinter Commission’s conclusion that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exit. The Badinter Commission had also revived the colonial ‘uti possidetis juris’ principle, which recognises as the borders of states seceding from a colonial power those that had marked the area of the seceding states’ pre-colonial possession. Weird though this revival was, the EU and the UN were both happy with it. But, oh dear! Where are the borders of the Vojvodina (Vajdaság) that Trianon had cut off from Hungary to give to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes? I wonder if the Hungarian component of the Visegrad Four will even look in that direction? I suppose the present Hungarian Government’s Foreign Minister will do everything possible to avoid that. Or, remembering US Senator Tom Lantos’s yet-unexplained keenness to support the interests of Vojvodina Hungarians (see his open letter to Kostunica), will our beloved Foreign Minister go for broke to raise it? I’d like that, but for the fact that Lantos also does; that makes me very vary.
@Elle – I’m no lawyer, but this is what I found.
Uti possidetis (Latin for “as you possess”) is a principle in international law that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless provided for by treaty. This principle enables a belligerent party to claim territory that it has acquired by war.
To Curious George. Nobody can ‘claim territory acquired by war’ since the inception of the UN Charter. See Article 2, re the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and UN Security Council Resolution 242.
Here is a definition from the American Journal of Law:
‘At the core of the legal debate over the territory of new states is the principle of uti possidetis. Stated simply, uti possidetis provides that states emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of independence. It largely governed the determination of the size and shape of the states of former Spanish Latin America beginning in the early 1800s, as well as former European Africa and Southeast Asia beginning in the 1950s. The relevance of uti possidetis today is evidenced by the practice of states during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, apparently sanctifying the former internal administrative lines as interstate frontiers.’
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=79267468,
European Court of Justice says, in Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554 (if you care to look it up!) that uti possidentis juris is ‘a firmly established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned’.
@Elle – as far as I understand, Vojvodina was never a ‘colony’ but an integral part of Hungary which was lost in a war. It is also not an independent country. Furthermore, the UN charter is not retroactive to events occurring before Oct ’45.
So the relevance of the definition (& your link) is strange.
However, if you’ve got H. Elliott Greene & Associates arguing in your corner, how can you possibly lose?
Whatever journals of law or UN charters are invoked or looked at, my spin on this is that territorial revisions, by peaceful means, will not be entertained around here nor sanctioned by international law, unless the Hungarian population in Bacska asks for, and wins a plebescite. Even that might be a tough stretch.
Should the Serbs start violently purging the Hungarians in a manner reminiscent of Milosovic and Karadzic, with ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions, then I think some use of force on our part would be tolerated, except by Russia and China.
To Farkas László: You are quite right. The Vojvodina Hungarians (and the Erdely and Slovakia ones) would themselves have to assert their right to self-determination, and declare what they want their political alignment to be. There is no set-in-stone international law in this matter. So opportunity exists. That’s why I think today’s meeting of FMs will put up something interesting.
To Curious George: You said that ‘So the relevance of the definition (& your link) is strange’. Not so. Uti possidetis was the principle invoked by the Badinter Commission in the case of the disintegration of the FRY, in 1992. The UN Security Council adopted it. It is the dominant principle in the disposition of the constituent parts of the former FRY. Vojvodina was one such constituent part. It is now part of Serbia. That is not consistent with the uti possidetis principle if ‘a people’ of the Vojvodina want to exercise their right to self-determination and secede from it. (In law, the Vojvodina was never a part of Serbia. It was once, however, a part of Hungary. So uti possidetis has a lot of scope for the Vojvodina Hungarians.)
You are right that the Charter is not retrospective. But Article 2 of the Charter asserts the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. I pointed that out only to correct your view that a version of the uti possidetis principle that recognises the appropriation of territory by war can exist as contemporary international law.
@Elle – As I said, I’m not a lawyer.
From my understanding, Vojvodina was an autonomous region within the state of Serbia, and not a constituent republic within the FRY. Also, the Badinter commission didn’t seem to identify Vojvodina as one.
You interpreted my views incorrectly. My sense is that no annexation of territory of a UN member country would be entertained through war – meaning the UN would recognize whatever existing borders countries had upon membership. This includes Serbia and Hungary. Peaceful cessation from Serbia would entail agreements from both Vojvodina and Serbia. Your interpretation of the principle seem to be in conflict with the UN charter for member countries.
I can’t debate actual legalities having only a layman’s perspective. If you think you have a strong case, you’re welcome to lobby your government to take up this issue. Considering the outcome in New York, maybe they had a good reason not to dabble too much in international law just yet.
@ Elle;
Really dumb question about to be asked, so please do not roll your eyes.
If you say that the Hungarian component of the Visegard Four do not look in the direction of Vajdasag, is there anybody else that can bring it up. I mean you mentioned US Senator Tome Lantos as well as the Foreign Minister. Or, when Fidesz win in the spring, can another meeting be rescheduled or would that Government aviod this topic/opportunity as well?
@ Elle;
I ment to include the word borders. I was asking about Vojdasag borders.
@justasking, Elle – Ah, finally something I have experience in. In multi-lateral discussions, the agenda is usually mutually agreed upon beforehand. I doubt if Slovakia will entertain any Fidesz initiated agenda, and I think a subsequent meeting will only materialise if (Fidesz) tows a common line.
@ George;
Okay, another moronic question, Why are/would the politicians avoiding this topic/opportunity?
Curious G., etc.
“From my understanding, Vojvodina was an autonomous region within the state of Serbia, and not a constituent republic within the FRY”
As was Kosovo, if the International Court of Justice confirms Kosovo’s right to secede, it confirms the Vajdaság’s right to secede.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Court_of_Justice_advisory_opinion_on_the_legality_of_Kosovo%27s_unilaterally_proclaimed_independence
@justasking – No, its not a moronic question, but perhaps naive. I don’t know why they are avoiding it. You see it as an opportunity because you are looking only at one point of interest. From Hungary’s standpoint, they may have dozens of other priorities.
Simple reasons:
a. Not on the agenda. If Hungary tried to sneak it in at the summit, I see Slovakia (& maybe the others) voting it down, or walking out. I can’t even see a Fidesz govt doing this.
b. No legal basis. You are buying Elle’s standpoint. It may be incorrect.
c. Not wanting to be seen hijacking the whole summit with a personal agenda.
d. Adhering to EU’s common stand – you still need their money.
e. UNSC – security council seat – you need friends & votes.
f. You may have economic or political interests in other countries which override bringing it up here.
g. You dont really have a good minority record right now, so you’re not going to be taken seriously on other countries minorities.
h. Russian gas. You gonna pick on their buddy, Serbia, and get try to away with that?
i Wrong forum to initiate this.
j. Wrong timing
k. Finding other countries to support or advocate such a position along with Hungary.
.
.
.
z. Being paid off (by whom?) not to bring it up. Least likely reason, but also a possibility.
@ George;
Son of a Bitch! Only A to Z! Got it though, point/s taken. Pretty good for 5 beers and X amount of shooters!
@Sophist – yes, you have a point. The similarities are that they were both autonomous regions within Serbia. However, the decision of ICJ may have also been prompted by ethnic cleansing events or the desire to avoid genocide.
In the absence of that, I dont know if Vojvodina would be seen in the same light.
Also, I’m not sure of whether precedence judgements are the norm in international law or ICJ, or do they go on a case-by-case basis.
Curious G.,
Like you I’m not an expert!
International law as I understand it is entirely determined by the terms of treaties and the jurispudence underlying those terms. I don’t think Kosovo can be thought of as a ‘precedent’ in the same sense of legal precedent in say English common law. What I was trying to suggest is that the Vajdaság has the same constituional form as so has the same legal rights as Kosovo.
Similarly, I guess that ethnic cleansing is not material legally to the ICJ judgement. When Yugoslavia broke up there was no war in Macedonia as there had been in Slovenia, Croatia etc., but the Badinter Commission awarded Macedonia the same rights of secession as the other states of the Yugoslav federation.
@Sophist – Yes, I think they both would have the same legal rights. While the ethnic cleaning material is not legally relevant in any decision, I’m not sure they wont take it into their considerations.
Would the judges ignore the basic responsibility of humanity & organized society over treaty obligations?
We would probably have to wait for the judgement and the reasons behind it.
To Sophist: You said ‘the Vajdaság has the same constitutional form as so has the same legal rights as Kosovo’. We do not yet know what the ‘legal rights’ of Kosovo are. It is still under the administration of UNMIK, despite the fact that a majority of UN member states had rushed to recognise it as the independent state of ‘Kosova’. The Badinter Commission did not even take a look askance at the Vajdaság. So we do not know what its status is vis-à-vis the Badinter version of ‘uti possidetis juris’. Perhaps Curious George is not wrong to invoke the relevance of ethic cleansing. After all, the Serbs of Krajna were given no ‘uti possidetis juris’ (à la Badinter Commission) rights: the Croats just turfed them out. I do wonder whether the Kosovo/Vojvodina comparison, in this light, should not give way to the Krajna comparison. (International law, especially in this area, is an ass.)
To Curious George: You are not accurate when you say ‘Vojvodina was an autonomous region within the state of Serbia, and not a constituent republic within the FRY’. The FRY had no states. It had administrative regions. The Vojvodina was an administrative region in exactly the same sense that was, say, Croatia. The naming of administrative regions of the FRY was not allowed to associate with an ethnic identity that was not a member of the FRY (in this case, with Hungary). In no sense was the Vojvodina ever a part of Serbia. Serbia did not exist as a state after the formation of the FRY, until its dissolution. That the Vojvodina is now declared by Serbia to be part of itself is a legal slight of hand. This is where I see an opportunity for at least a part of the Vojvodina to declare itself a part of Hungary, as the Vajdaság.
I’m not sure that I follow your UN point. But you are right in that UN practice (viz. the break-up of the USSR and Czechoslovakia) was to accept the dissolution of a state and the formation of new states as the seceding entities and the ‘parent’ entity agree. But there was no such agreement between the FRY and Croatia and Slovenia, yet the UN gave Croatia and Slovenia seats as new state entities. Also, notice that the UN did not allow the rump FRY (by then Serbia-Montenegro) to occupy the General Assembly seat of the former FRY. (Russia was allowed to occupy the seat of the former USSR. Serbia-Montenegro had to re-apply for UN membership. And now that Montenegro is also an independent state, Serbia sits alone. That dissolution was agreed, as the secession of Macedonia had been agreed.) So again: the Vojvodina is an autonomous region within Serbia only because no-one has done anything about it. The Visegrad Four will probably ignore this legal anomaly as blithely as the Badinter Commission had.
@Elle – A quick wiki peek (yes, I know….) shows SFRY consisting of 6 Republics with Serbia having 2 autonomous regions within it. So, there must have been some form of distinction, either in terms of representation, or in legal form.
As Serbia did not have its own assembly, the issue of whether Vojvodina and Kosova existed as equal ‘components’ together with the rest of Serbia, or as as entity which in total, represents the undivided population of Serbia is not something I can argue since I have not read the Yugoslav constitution. To me, if it was the 2nd form would indicate that, under UN charter, Serbia had to agree on a split. This also appears to be the basis for Serbia case to the ICJ.
Also, allowing it to be viewed the way you would want, would also open a bucket of worms with regards to the 4 or 5 Russia autonomous oblasts or okrugs. Also, the Felvidek in Slovakia wouldn’t be so different. I can’t imagine the political consequences.
On the UN point, I think I wanted to say that the UN recognizes only the fixed land area of each member country at the point of membership. Any changes should be by mutual agreement. Hence, Hungary applied for membership with 96000 sqkm, and I think that is what is recognised. Serbia with 88000 sqkm etc. So, no growing or shrining except by mutual agreement. I remember Viking also writing that the EU constitution does not recognise changes in land area of member countries.
As I said, I’m not the one to you need to convince.
Curious,
” I remember Viking also writing that the EU constitution does not recognise changes in land area of member countries”
What happened then, when Germany was reunified?
There is a parallel thread on this topic on Hungarian Spectrum, specifically addressing the Felvidék’ right to secede. I ended up going round and round in circles with “Mark”, but you might find it interesting.
http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2009/09/tension-renewed-slovakia-and-hungary.html?cid=6a00e009865ae588330120a5daef3a970c#comment-6a00e009865ae588330120a5daef3a970c
Elle,
” I do wonder whether the Kosovo/Vojvodina comparison, in this light, should not give way to the Krajna comparison. (International law, especially in this area, is an ass.)”
Well, we all agree with the last part. But a distinction can be made between Kosovo which was coeval with the YugoslavFederation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Province_of_Kosovo_and_Metohija_(1946-1974)
and the Krajina which was created as part of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Serbian_Krajina
How about Bosnia? This is the way of squaring the circle of the Helsinki accords which simulataneously recognise the right of self determination and the inadmissability of unilateral territorial changes: Republika Srpska, gives the Serbs a large degree of self-determination while preserving the pre-war borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Given the rules and the prevailing legal winds, the Hungarian government cannot be seen encouraging the exo-Hungarians to seccede. That of course does not stop Hungarians as private individuals from discussing such issues with our brethren.
Sophist, Krajna was a centuries-old Serb enclave in Croatia pre-FRY. It was certainly not created on the dissolution of the FRY. And the Croats unceremoniously turfed the Krajna Serbs out upon their secession from the FRY. Krajna is no more! Also, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the care of an administrator, the High Representative, who is not accountable to the local population, but to the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). So the Republika Srpska was a resounding failure, not a solution, thus proving the Helsinki Accord pretty damned silly (if indeed that needed proof). If the Serbs get nasty, the Vojvodina Hungarians might just meet the fate of the Krajna Serbs. Hence my proposal that the two situations are worth comparing. (For what it’s worth, though: I am in Szabatka now. I get very little impression from the Hungarians there of a desire to join Hungary proper. Funny?)
Hello Elle,
Your parting observation, that the Hungarians in Szbadka have little desire to join Hungary proper is interesting to me. Why do you think that is so? What do they say?
I wonder if their hesistance to express a desire to rejoin Hungary proper is based upon fear of harassment and violent Serb reprisal. After all, these people stand to be beaten up by the police, and to disappear in the night. Serbia is hardly a model of legality, and their recent history in their dealings with non-Serb groups under their rule forms an appalling chapter in modern European history. The Hague Tribunal (joke that it is!), is still operating. That new defendents may yet enter it’s doors is still a possibility.
Thanks for your question, Farkas László. Frankly, I’m perplexed. It’s early days yet, and I have probably been a bit ham-fisted with my approach to people on this subject. But they have been pretty assertive, quite simply saying that they want to remain the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Your suggestion, that they are fearful of saying otherwise, is very, very useful. Thanks a million. I shall keep my ear to the ground on that one. (Having technical problems: Blackberry seems reluctant to communicate with my computer. Shall return when resolved.)
Thanks very much Elle!
See if you can get these Hungarians from “Vojvodina” to open up to you when they are on OUR side of the border! It would be dangerous for them to talk “secession” from Serbia with strangers, even Hungarian speaking ones.
Serbia is still a police state, especially in it’s dealings with a non-Serb minority. I remember all too well what living in a police state was like. The “walls had ears”; people who you trusted would turn you in; “provocateurs” working for the cops would say subversive things, just to see if you agreed. And they came in the night, arresting you, your family and friends. And no legal system to save you.
From a purely practical standpoint, I find it hard to believe that our Magyar brethren down there really prefer rule from Belgrade rather than Budapest, when the Serb cops beat them up for being Hungarian, and given that Serbia is even more economically and politically dysfunctional and underdeveloped. What to the Serbs have to offer that would make them throw in their lot with Belgrade? Good questions!
Let’s keep this dialogue open. If anyone else can offer personal anecdotes or insights from first hand experience, I would love to hear them!
I’d like to think the main reason there are any Hungarians left in Vojvodina, is because the Serbs feared a military response from us had any “ethnic cleansing” occurred against our people.
Elle,
“Krajna was a centuries-old Serb enclave in Croatia pre-FRY. It was certainly not created on the dissolution of the FRY”
Obviously, but an “enclave” isn’t a state, nor apparently is a “Serbian Autonomous Oblast”:
“Babić’s administration announced the creation of a Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (or SAO Krajina) on 21 December 1990″ (wiki as above)
The issue before the ICJ is whether or not the
“Autonomous Province” of Kosovo and Metohija is a state. International law is law between states not peoples.
To Curious George, about your October 7, 2009 2:20 PM comment, re the Yugoslav Constitution: the SFRY’s 1963 Constitution speaks of administrative regions. The ‘autonomous provinces’ concept was introduced only with the 1974 Constitution. That brought with it the distinction ‘republics’. This was seriously peculiar, because that gave the SFRY republics that were not really nations and that had no constitutions. So in what sense ‘republics’? This peculiarity was kept afloat only by Tito’s desire to satisfy the restive nationalisms of the time: ‘Yugoslav’ one-ness was no longer absolutely mandatory. (But how it had been modified was not clear.) When push came to shove in the late ’eighties, Yugoslav constitutional lawyers were seriously embarrassed by what ‘unit’ concepts were implicit in this singular Yugoslav concept of ‘republics’. That is why Milosevic became edgy and ‘re-integrated’ Kosovo and the Vojvodina into Serbia, as in the 1946 Constitution (not as autonomous entities), and soon after, the SFRY became the FRY.
(cont.) I doubt that anyone would suggest that this ‘re-integration’ has any sort of UN standing. The UN is concerned only with the obligation to respect external borders, pursuant to articles 2(4) and (7). So Wiki is wacky when it asserts that the Vojvodina is a part of Serbia in any legally respectable sense. Kosovo possibly is, for historical reasons, but that’s a longshot.
Also, you said: ‘UN recognizes only the fixed land area of each member country at the point of membership. Any changes should be by mutual agreement.’ Actually, the UN Charter says nothing at all about border change, by agreement or otherwise.(Nasty gap, that.)
Sorry to interrupt your cozy exchange but have you guys looked at the population census numbers for Vojvodina lately? There are dozens of ethnic groups living in that region, with Hungarians comprising about 15%, so I wonder on what grounds would your Hungarian brethren over the border base their secession claims?
Oh, and about Kosovo: except for the “minor” issue of an attempt at ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population and the fact that Albanians made up more than 80% of the population (even before their round of ethnic cleansing after the war), can you draw any more parallels between Vojvodina and Kosovo with regards to hypothetical Hungarian secession claims? I am all ears.
@Elle – I’m not sure about your logic on the 2 regions. The constitution was updated/changed a few times, 46, 63, 74, and in the 80s. Your preference is to recognize only the ’63 constitution which treats Vojvodina as an administrative regions. As you said, it was part of Serbia in 46, and again in 1990. What makes the other constituions any less official to the Yugoslavs?
If Yugoslavia was a single member country in the UN at the time, any modification of the regions within its borders, or how it chooses to define regions is a purely internal matter. So the UN is not ‘required’ to have an opinion.
On the issue of borders, yes, you are correct. It doesn’t specifically mention borders, but as you pointed out 2(4) and 2(7) can be interpreted quite widely, since it refers to the principles of the UN, a typical catch-all phrase allowing for varying degrees of interpretation (usually in favour of the majority opinion). In totality, the UN charter can be expected to respect the territorial integrity (hence borders) of member states.
If you disagree with me, that’s fine since I’m giving you a logical laymans’ view. You haven’t mentioned whether the Hungarian Ministry shares your interpretation on these point. If they don’t, then its no surprise that they will not bring this up.
If you believe your interpretation is correct, why don’t you take it up with them, or through the law society (or the Hungarian equivalent here) and have them push the issue to the Min. Good Luck.
To Curious George. You say quite wrongly: ‘but as you pointed out 2(4) and 2(7) can be interpreted quite widely, since it refers to the principles of the UN’. I pointed out no such thing. Besides the articles of the UN Charter are statutory provisions, not UN principles. Perhaps I should also call your attention to the fact that the FRY itself submitted to the Badinter Commission that its internal borders are no more than administrative borders. (See Opinions no, 2, 4 and 6.) So that was the FRY position, too, in 1992. So there is no point in your alleging that it is my ‘preference is to recognize only the ’63 constitution’. That seems to have been the FRY preference too, with regard to its internal ‘borders’. In any case, there nothing one might point to in the threadbare thing that is international law that will oblige a people to live as minorities because there is an international diktat that they must. The fate of the Vojvodina Hungarians, therefore, remains open. That is why I wonder whether the Hungarian component of the Visegrad Four will see fit to raise the issue.
To Eli: I’m not sure what you are getting at. But if no secession claim is possible on a 15% of population, then the inverse is also true: Serbia cannot lay claim to Kosovo, because the Serbian population there is less than 10% and falling. Also, do remember that in the northern section of Vojvodina, contiguously with the Hungarian border, the Hungarian population is the majority population. (But, as far as I can make out, and I am in situ, there is no secession intention among the Vojvodina Hungarians. Instead, they seem keen on the geographic autonomy of the northern Vojvodina as a Hungarian autonomous region with a multi-ethnic population. This is, I’m told, at a presented-draft stage. This quite blew me over. I am still investigating.)
@Elle – Article 2 of the UN Charter
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
(It then proceeds to list 7 things) So, it appears they indeed had some ‘principles’ in mind when they wrote it. Or is it your opinion that it was wrongly worded, or that I should understand something else from it.
You might be right on FRY’s submissions to the Badinter commission (I’ve no interest to research the specific submissions further or debating any legal points – I’m not a lawyer, nor am I going to spend my time collecting documents or interviewing people from the region).
I’m actually more interested that you still haven’t answered whether the Hungarian govt shares your legal opinions, since you’re expecting them to bring up the issue.
Is it possible they already knew what you just discovered about the Vojvodina Hungarians desires, or that there are other holes in your legal reasoning? That would help provide an explanation for your question.
@Elle–I never said that Serbia had any legitimate claims over Kosovo (in my opinion it doesn’t). But I am confused as to what point you are raising because in your openining post you wrote this:
“Where are the borders of the Vojvodina (Vajdaság) that Trianon had cut off from Hungary to give to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes? I wonder if the Hungarian component of the Visegrad Four will even look in that direction? ”
and I am still unsure what is it that you would like the V4 to look at–giving Vojvodina back to Hungary? If yes, would it be in its pre-Trianon borders, which are its current borders as an autonomous region within Serbia?
But then later you seem to backtrack and talk about an autonomy for Northern Vojvodina (quite a new term for me, not sure what it would comprise; currently Vojvodina consists of three sub-regions: Srem, Banat, Backa) so, again, what exactly do you want V4 to look at?
Sorry, Eli, but I cannot say that I actually ‘want’ anything. I am watching the situation in the Vojvodina from Szabadka, and trying to assess what the local Hungarians are aspiring to. I used ‘Northern Vojvodina’ as a geographic term (which the locals are also using, as does the draft autonomy document – still working my way through it – that is before the Serbian National Parliament now). It encompasses most (possibly all) of the Bacska area of Vojvodina, where the Hungarian population is concentrated. The Hungarian component of the Visegrad Four should, surely, have a view on this autonomy draft document. I do not know, of course, whether it does or not. But my strong suspicion, given the political hue of the present government, is that it will not go to a lot of trouble to support the Vojvodina Hungarians’ position. That position is quite interesting, given its territorial-autonomy component and the consequent ‘autonomy within the Vojvodina autonomy’ component, and its multi-ethnic-population proposition.
The Trianon legacy as it relates to borders and this region remains, I contend, an issue, albeit a generally ignored one. Trianon gave the Vojvodina to the Kindom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Not only this entity but also its heir (the SFRY/FRY) no loner exist. Do you not think that this raises the issue of where, then, is the border between Serbia and Hungary? And if not, why not? For certainly, Trianon did not award the Vojvodina to Serbia.
TO Farkas László:
I’m getting ‘feedback’ emails after my rather-less-than-successful attempt at field study in Szabadka. Here is a no-words-minced one (I capitalised the most depressing remark in it):
Már írtam, hogy “kevesen vagyunk”, de azon túl is az itteni magyarok majdnem fele szerb pártok tagjai, és a megmaradt rész is még 4 pártban megoszlik, s ebből már kisejlik, mennyire lehetnek hatékonyak. AMI AZ AUTONÓMIÁT, LEVÁLÁST, AZ ANYAORSZÁGHOZ VALÓ CSATLAKOZÁST ILLETI – TELJESEN NAÍV AZ ELKÉPZELÉSED. Gondolj bele, a baszkok Spanyolországban mióta küzdenek a függetlenségükért, stb. De a magyaroknak még mindig annyi írígye van a szomszédos országok között, s az egész Európának is beleszólása van az ilyen különválsá-csatlakozás dolgában… Erről egyébként sincs szó, csak arról, hogy ne legyünk szellemileg, anyagilag, politikailag elnyomva, és annak a módozatait szeretnénk fokozatosan elérni a meglevő határokon belül.
Should I hear from anyone who is less pessimistic, I shall let you know.
Thank you Elle!!
You can receive and publish other emails if you like, but this one hit it on the head, and I agree with it’s realistic assesment. For the benefit of our English only readers, I will highlight a few passages in translation:
1)”Már írtam, hogy “kevesen vagyunk”…” (As I’ve written, there are few of us…)
Indeed. Since Milosovic’s conversion from communist apparatchick to violent nationalist in 1989, Serbia has been a country for Magyars to get the hell out of. Many have “voted with their feet”. Some of those who stayed had to fight in the insane wars of the 90′s. (I recall seeing a retreating Serb army bus from Kosovo in 1998, and in it’s window was stuck a red-white-and green tricolor, as a signal to Albanian insurgents that the soldiers on the bus are not Serb, but Hungarian!)
2)”AMI AZ AUTONÓMIÁT, LEVÁLÁST, AZ ANYAORSZÁGHOZ VALÓ CSATLAKOZÁST ILLETI – TELJESEN NAÍV AZ ELKÉPZELÉSED…” (Your ideas of anything pertaining to autonomy, secession or annexation to the mother country, are naive.)
(cont)
(cont)
3)”De a magyaroknak még mindig annyi írígye van a szomszédos országok között, s az egész Európának is beleszólása van az ilyen különválsá-csatlakozás dolgában… Erről egyébként sincs szó, csak arról, hogy ne legyünk szellemileg, anyagilag, politikailag elnyomva, és annak a módozatait szeretnénk fokozatosan elérni a meglevő határokon belül.”
(But the nieghboring nations still bear envy (or grudge) against the Hungarians, and all Europe also has a say in such a matter of secession or annexation… There is no talk of this however, only about how we should not be oppressed mentally, materially and politically, and for us to achieve changes gradually within the existing borders.)
So it is. It will take another Balkan war someday (and there probably will be another one eventually), and then of course, anything can happen. It’s not out of the question that the results of the Trianon treaty could breed another conflict someday as well, and here I am being a realist. (I saw the possibility of a violent Serb-Croat war ten years before it happened in 1991) Our correspondent uses the word naive; I say it’s also naive to think Hungarians are ever going to forget Trianon, especially when there are still a number of our brethren in neighboring countries.
TO Farkas László: As you say. But is it not a blow that, few though they are, some of them are actually members of Serb parties, and the rest divide as no fewer than four factions? I really cannot see much ‘right to the self-determination of people’ gelling out of this little scene.
Thanks for doing the transaltion. I shan’t be so lazy next time!
Dear Elle,
Again thanks for the excellent post. I avoided translating the part about “half belonging to Serb parties, and the remaining half belonging to four factions”, as the meaning of that was not totally clear. Overall, the writer was quite clear, and I think his assessment was spot on.
Feel free to post more responses. I feel for these people down there; it wouldn’t be fun for a Magyar to get in trouble with those Serb cops.No problem about the translation; glad to do it.
I hate to see Hungarian regions and villages depopulated through fear of police intimidation and lack of opportunity. What else could have been expected in this case?