Jobbik has derailed Fidesz’s electoral strategy of coasting toward victory this April while barely lifting a finger. Although so far the salvos from Fidesz have come from the more peripheral figures, it is increasingly apparent that in this election campaign, Fidesz will have to do more than just show up, and that they won’t be campaigning against the Socialists so much as they will against the party to their right. Considering the massive lead they hold in the polls and with election predictions vacillating over whether the party will get a two-thirds majority or not, Fidesz’s plan was basically to say as little as possible to not lose any potential voters and just let the rest happen by itself.

With the Socialist campaign not getting much traction as seemingly every other day a new corruption scandal emerges, some of which are tied directly to their politicians, they are slowly sinking while treading water, to the point that the party didn't even respond to a Fidesz potshot the last time around.

Jobbik, however, has focused their campaign on tying Fidesz and the Socialists together as much as possible (something Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai also did, albeit in a much different light) and this apparently finally struck a nerve within the Fidesz camp.

Reading Gábor Horn's comments about how the Kóka-Fodor "duel" killed the liberals, all I could think about was how Horn had finally settled on a scapegoat for his party's demise, and how wrong he was.

The Free Democrats' problems more or less began when they entered a coalition government with the Socialists in 1994 despite the Socialists already possessing a majority outright in the number of seats. While during this government cycle the two were awkward partners, they nonetheless warmed up to each other, and after losing the elections, worked in tandem during the 2002 elections when they reentered parliament, with the relationship being much more cozy this time around.

Over the years, despite public squabbles, the Free Democrats unwaveringly supported the Socialists, so that it became increasingly difficult to differentiate between the two. Following the collapse of support for the Socialists with the revelation of the "lies speech", support for the Free Democrats collapsed as well, who steadfastly stood by the unpopular prime minister and his party.

The political struggles of the upcoming year in Hungary will be deeply impacted by the fact that the left's "sacrificing" of its leader - former premier Ferenc Gyurcsány - and the subsequent elevation of Gordon Bajnai to prime minister has overturned a delicate balance which has existed for the past five years.

Fidesz leader (and former prime minister) Viktor Orbán and Gyurcsány may have very different personalities and dispositions. But in some ways they are very much alike - enough that, while Gyurcsány was in power, there was what you might call "leader symmetry." Both Orbán and Gyurcsány are "leading" personalities, and their capabilities and communicational competence place them on the same level. Both are good at playing with voters' emotions, but what is even more important in the game of power-politics is that both are exceptionally well-suited for demonization. The strengthening of emotions felt towards the leader of the rival party is the classic and most trusted instrument of negative PR so often used in Hungary.

As the left is highly unlikely to renew its political credo or otherwise offer an attractive alternative to the opposition in the brief time before the next election, and the right - in order to maximize its votes - is likely to keep its real intentions under wraps, it is not hard to predict that negative campaigning (and especially demonization) will play a bigger role than ever during the run-up to the elections.

I got some grief from commenters when I wrote a few weeks back that I thought the odds of an "expert" government coming in to power were higher than most so-called "experts" seemed to believe. While my argument probably overstated the odds of such a "non-political" cabinet resulting from a regularly-scheduled election, over the past few days I think I've been rather spectacularly vindicated on the general issue of whether Hungary's next government will be led by one of another of the country's professional political-types. And now I am going to double-down on my bet and tell you who I think the next PM is likely to be, and whether this person's rise to power would be a good thing.

Even before the resignation bombshell that Ferenc Gyurcsány dropped on Saturday, there has been quite a bit of speculation on who might replace him, aside from Viktor Orbán, who in a proper election would probably have little difficulty easing back into the prime minister's office. But since Saturday, there has been a regular blizzard of "trial balloons" involving potential candidates. Here are among those that have floated up and quickly popped:

• Péter Kiss: A lot of deep-red Socialists probably think it would be great to promote the consummate political operator now running the Prime Minister's office (chancellery) to the top job itself. But he'd be about as much of a break with the Socialists' failed tenure as Constantine Chernenko was a breath of post-Brezhnev fresh air. Just the fact that people have seriously mentioned him as a PM shows how deep Hungary's political dysfunction is.
• Imre Szekeres: A useless party hack.
• József Graf: Ditto, and he even looks a bit like Chernenko.
• Gordon Bajnai: A primary reason Gyurcsány needs to go is that he's a guy who got rich milking the system in the awkward position of trying to tell middle-class voters not to depend on state handouts. Ditto for Bajnai.
• Lajos Bokros: If I had the chance to vote for someone to be given the task of pulling Hungary out of its current mess I would probably vote for Bokros, because he's already fixed the country once when it got into a mess almost exactly like today's, and once told me something at a cocktail party that was so funny I almost spit up my drink. But I don't vote in Hungary, and apparently no one who actually does thinks like me.
• László Békési: A co-author of the report recently put out by the "Reform Alliance" group calling for significant cuts in government spending, Békési is, like Bokros, a former finance minister with lots of experience dealing with the sorts of post-communist adjustment problems Hungary is dealing with. Unfortunately, one of those stints as finance minister was all the way back before Hungary became post-communist, which makes it hard to picture him putting some spring back in the country's step, while a lot of MSZPers think he's too post-communist for the job.
• Ferenc Glatz: A former president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in theory sounds like an uncontroversial choice, but Glatz apparently made too many Socialist enemies due to his role in the Reform Alliance.
• Tamás Mészáros: Having the dean of Budapest's prestigious Corvinus University step in to save the day sounds like a great idea, but Mészáros apparently has said no thanks.

Then we have the central bankers.

Of all the words regularly thrown at Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány by his opponents, one of the rare positive adjectives is that he is clever. Today's announcement that he'll resign as prime minister if the Socialist Party can find a successor in two weeks' time is just one more example. The question of course, is why offer to resign now?

The decision by Democratic Forum chairwoman Ibolya Dávid to place Lajos Bokros at the head of her party's European Parliamentary electoral list has been nothing short of controversial, with response generally negative. While questioning the motives behind the decision (which also placed György Habsburg second on the list), the move is essentially what in American Football is termed a "Hail Mary" pass, in that it is a final gasp for success in the face of overwhelming odds.

If the ongoing global financial crisis has already taught us one lesson, it is that you should be on guard whenever "the experts" say that some event that seems unlikely to happen is guaranteed not to happen. Because, as we have seen, such "black swan" events which scramble all the conventional wisdom have a way of occurring more often than the supposedly very smart people who together generate the conventional wisdom like to admit.

While some Hungarian media outlets have called Katalin Szili’s entry into the upcoming special mayoral election in Pécs this May a forced candidacy, it is in fact a calculated tactical move that stands to pay off richly for the Speaker of the National Assembly. A native of Pécs, Szili's entry into the race is meant to stabilize the local Socialist Party which is largely in disarray and expected to show poorly without her participation.

Observers have stated that if Szili wins, she will inherit a city that is far behind schedule in its plans to complete projects for its turn as the European Capital of Culture for 2010, among a host of other problems. She would have an exceptionally difficult time turning the city's recent fortunes around, and failure to do so could permanently damage her political standing not only within her party but among the electorate as well. A loss in the election would have the same effect, only much more immediately.

From time to time, the idea of a smaller parliament is brought up in Hungarian politics. It would not save a lot of money, but is nevertheless popular due to its symbolic value, and all the parties have declared themselves in favor of it. This time, it is Ferenc Gyurcsány who came up with a proposal along this line: he suggested that the number of representatives should be reduced to 199, and the current, mixed electoral system should be replaced with a list-based one. The Fidesz plan would keep 200 MPs, but also single-member constituencies.

Leaving behind a politically eventful year, it is definitely the dawn of a new age considering the main points of conflict within the field of political discourse. Last year was dominated by the narratives concerning the government's ability to act, and questions surrounding its legitimacy. As the government somewhat stabilized its position with the acceptance of the budget and the tax-laws, not only the incapability factor but the topic of the early elections will disappear from the political agenda. The question is therefore evident: what decisive leitmotifs will continue to define the Hungarian political agenda? The theoretical debates within the field of communication play a peremptory effect in the sphere of political actions. For instance, amongst several other factors, the government's commitment towards reforms became a victim of this fight as well. This is exactly why it is such a crucial question which will be this years main points of conflict, what new fronts the political parties will open and what questions they raise in order to win the voters, since let's not forget, we are facing an election year. Elections will be held for the European Parliament in June, what more, the campaign for the 2010 elections will almost definitely commence with the end of the year.

Permanent crisis management
The most evident theme of the year is the crisis. The first fights over its interpretation already took place last year, however with newer and newer aspects of the crisis of the real economy coming to light, more and more rhetoric clashes are to be expected. Naturally, it is in the interest of the opposition that, considering the negative effects of the crisis, the citizens place as much of the blame as possible on the government. The government's interest, on the other hand, is for the crisis to appear to have come from outside the country (an "attack") and to be something the government is able to control or alleviate.

Lajos Bokros, minister of finance in the administration of Gyula Horn - and author of the (in)famous "Bokros Package" of austerity measures during that time - recently published a lengthy essay in a special supplement of the weekly Élet és Irodalom entitled "The critical mass of the reforms," focusing on solutions for Hungary's social and economic problems. Given Bokros' high profile, especially in the international community, it is worthwhile to take a look at some of the weaknesses of his essay.

The political context of the suggested reform
The essay doesn't give an adequate answer to the concrete (political) execution of the reforms. In other words, Bokros does not specify the suitable political environment for the execution of the suggested reforms. Viewing himself as an independent expert, the author presumably did not want to deal with the question of political powers, and thus fails to raise the crucial question: "Who has to conduct the reforms?"

The effects of the international economic crisis have been determining the potentialities and agenda of Hungarian politics since September, 2008. The issue of the crisis shall probably remain in the background of the domestic political agenda in the year 2009 as well. The parties have to adapt themselves to the newly evolved and continuously changing situation, for the lack of crucial decisions will result in an ongoing struggle to provide adequate answers to newly arising problems.

There are some pretty hard-hitting quotes being attributed to MSZP bad boy János Zuschlag today, the man at the center of the corruption trial it is hoped will bring down much of Hungary's political elite. The first headline-grabber sounds like an admission of quilt: "It was me they called when they wanted money." The second Zuschlag soundbite cites 1998 as the top of the slippery slope into the valley of corruption and embezzlement. Unfortunately, juicy as these quotes might sound, there is nothing actually there when you read between the lines. The statements are actually quite far from the detailed confession Hungary is expecting.

Hungary's two political "tops dogs" aren't particularly known for their ability to get good press for themselves in the foreign media. But two pieces in the Financial Times this week show they can still manage to hoodwink the occasional unsuspecting journalist.

This will be a tough year for most Hungarians. (One of) Europe's
sick men will be hit hard, by the monster never seen before, and no one can really predict what it is capable of. Hungarians did not see what was coming, and this is going to make their lives even more uncomfortable. They have spent at Christmas as if it would be the last one, and despite the difficulties, they are doing everything to keep their living standard on a level that they could not really afford even before the crisis. Now, almost 90% of Hungarians say they are unable save a forint, meaning they are living on their savings or taking out even more loans - loans which are not getting cheaper. An ability to adapt would be useful during these rather troubling times, but these are skills we are not particular rich in.

Despite the bizarre idiosyncrasies of Hungary's electoral system, the country's electoral politics tend to follow the same rules governing other democracies. Chief among these is the importance of the "centrist" or "swing" voters who feel no strong attachment to either (or any) of the main parties vying for power. So it's always important to try to keep on top of what one famous American historian once dubbed "The Vital Center." And at least to me, Hungary's vital center seems to be increasingly preoccupied with two things: avoiding becoming as poor as Gypsies, and the Gypsies.

Barring some unforeseeable event, the first six months of 2009 in terms of Hungarian politics will be fairly uneventful. A minor scandal may erupt on one political side or the other, the leading politicians will spend their time publicly criticizing each other, but nothing of consequence is likely to happen. Following the European Parliamentary elections in June, the situation will dramatically change.

According to Vision Consulting director Gábor Török, Fidesz has gained far more from the Socialist Party's mistakes than they have through their own initiatives, and interview with index.hu revealed. Although the Socialists' competitiveness with Fidesz is lower than it was a year ago, they have managed to gain some ground on the main opposition party in the second half of the year.